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WHERE THERE’S SMOKE, THERE’S FIRE: THE STATE-
TRIBAL QUANDARY OF TRIBAL MARIJUANA 
 
Kyle Montour∗ 
 
[Indian communities] owe no allegiance to the states, and 
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, 
the people of the states, where they are found are often their 
deadliest enemies.1  
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1 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
2016] Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire 223 
	  
	  
B. Seminole Nation of Florida .......................................... 248 
C. Pinoville Pomo Nation................................................. 249 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................... 249 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 251 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between Indian tribes and the states has 
been one checkered by turmoil. State and local governments 
have long histories of using apparent legal authority and simple 
force to dispossess Indian people of land and property.2 On 
numerous occasions, the use of force turned deadly and resulted 
in the mass murder of Indian people in states like 
Massachusetts, Colorado, and California.3 Then, in the early 
half of the 20th century, states utilized their taxing and policing 
powers to exploit tribes.4 
Until recent years, tribal and state interests often clashed in 
a vigorous zero-sum game of civil regulation, taxation, and 
criminal jurisdiction; states tended to get the upper hand in most 
instances. But the judiciary has recognized enough exclusive 
tribal authority to create a common law presumption that state 
laws have no force in Indian Country.5 Still, some states 
continue to pursue legal and political warfare with tribes.6 
The next theater for this warfare will likely be marijuana. 
The recent publication of the Department of Justice Policy 
Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country7 
(“Indian Policy Statement”) has given tribes a “yellow light” to 
pursue marijuana development on tribal lands without federal 
interference; and tribal interests in marijuana have skyrocketed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the "Deadliest Enemies" Model of Tribal-
State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 78 (2007). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1959). 
6 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 78. 
7 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Policy Statement 
Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 
Policy Statement], available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/
11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountry2.pdf.  
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Still, the biggest obstacle to tribal marijuana development 
may be state interference, especially in states that only allow 
medical marijuana or no marijuana use at all. Whenever tribes 
seek to develop their economy in a way that conflicts with the 
neighboring state’s interest, there is typically a controversy. For 
example, Justice Thomas summarized state concerns in his Bay 
Mills dissent:  
 
[A]ny number of tribes across the country have 
emerged as substantial and successful 
competitors in interstate and international 
commerce, both within and beyond Indian lands. 
As long as tribal immunity remains out of sync 
with this reality, it will continue to invite 
problems, including de facto deregulation of 
highly regulated activities; unfairness to tort 
victims; and increasingly fractious relations with 
states and individuals alike.8 
 
This model of mutual animosity forms the backbone of tribal-
state relations to this day. 
In general, state laws and regulations do not have an effect 
inside Indian Country absent Congressional authority.9 The 
powers vested in tribes are inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty that have never been extinguished. After years of 
struggle to prevent further extinguishment of those powers, 
tribes should now move away from focusing on the “limits” of 
sovereignty and examine how they can activate the inherent 
powers that will expand and solidify tribal  sovereignty.10 
If a tribal sovereign makes a policy choice in any area of 
economic activity, the tribe has the sovereign right to do so, 
even if some state actors find the activity shocking or 
unsavory.11 It is likely that many states find the idea of tribal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2052 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
9 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.01[2] (2012 ed.) 
(quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945); Fletcher, supra note 2, at 
74. 
10 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 86. 
11 Jennifer H. Weddle, Suffer No Tyranny: How State-Tribal Relations Might 
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marijuana development within their borders very shocking and 
unsavory. Still, tribes have the “sovereign right to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them.”12 The issue with tribal 
marijuana development; however, is the permissible amount of 
state interference under the current jurisdictional framework. 
Each tribe will face different issues based upon their location 
and policies of the surrounding state. 
Currently under federal law, the development, sale, and 
consumption of marijuana is illegal under the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA).13 Colorado, Washington, Oregon, 
Alaska, and the District of Columbia have legalized adult-use 
marijuana. In addition, 23 States and the District of Columbia 
have legalized some form of medical marijuana.14 
This Article analyzes the jurisdictional issues surrounding 
the development of tribal marijuana in P.L. 280 and non-P.L. 
280 states and considers arguments tribes can raise to respond 
to these issues. Part I analyzes the recent Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Policy Statement regarding tribal marijuana and raises 
three hypothetical scenarios of tribes seeking to develop various 
forms of marijuana in different locations. Part II covers state 
criminal jurisdiction issues in P.L. 280 and non-P.L. 280 states. 
Part III addresses whether tribal sovereign immunity can shield 
the tribe and its employees from state prosecution. Part IV 
discusses the results of the proposed hypothetical scenarios. 
Finally, Part V covers recommendations to reduce state 
interference in tribal marijuana development. 
 
I. UNITED STATES DOJ POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING 
MARIJUANA ISSUES IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
On October 28, 2014, the United States Department of 
Justice sent a memorandum to all United States Attorneys 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Evolve in the Light of the Supreme Court's Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community Reluctance to Referee Intergovernmental Disputes, FED. LAW., 
April 2015, at 69. 
12 See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1997) (quoting 
Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976)). 
13 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2015). 
14 State Policy, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/ (last 
visited May 12, 2016). 
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titled “Policy Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian 
Country.”15 The Indian Policy Statement specifically provides 
CSA enforcement guidelines on tribal lands. To address this 
issue, the Indian Policy Statement references the Cole 
Memorandum and its eight main priorities. The DOJ released 
the Cole Memorandum in 2013, and it was a groundbreaking 
acknowledgement of states’ efforts to legalize the cultivation 
and sale of recreational marijuana. The Cole Memorandum and 
Indian Policy Statement suggest the DOJ will not enforce the 
CSA on state/tribal lands if states/tribes do not violate the 
following eight priorities: 
 
(1) Preventing the distribution of marijuana to 
minors; (2) Preventing revenue from the sale of 
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, 
gangs, and cartels; (3) Preventing the diversion of 
marijuana from states where it is legal under state 
law in some form to other states; (4) Preventing 
state-authorized marijuana activity from being 
used as cover or pretext for the trafficking of 
other illegal drugs or illegal activity; (5) 
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) 
Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation 
of other adverse public health consequences 
associated with marijuana use; (7) Preventing the 
growing of marijuana on public lands and the 
attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public 
lands; and (8) Preventing marijuana possession or 
use on federal property.16 
 
So long as tribes abide by these eight priorities, for the short 
term at least, it is unlikely that the DOJ will interrupt tribal 
marijuana cultivation and sale.17 Wyn Hornbuckle, a 
spokesman for the DOJ, stated tribes interested in legalizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Policy Statement, supra note 7. 
16 Id. 
17 Notably, the Indian Policy Statement recognizes tribal sovereignty and 
stresses the need to consult “with our tribal partners.” Id. 
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marijuana are not expected to consult with the department or 
federal officials.18 “American Indian tribes are sovereign 
governments, like states,” Hornbuckle declared.19 Hornbuckle 
also noted that tribal governments and local federal prosecutors 
“will consult on a government-to-government basis as issues 
arise.”20 Thus, the Indian Policy Statement recognizes the 
ability of tribes to cultivate marijuana in light of federal 
priorities. 
As a result of the Indian Policy Statement, tribal interest in 
marijuana production intensified. Tribes all across the country 
from the Aroostook to the Senecas to the Seminoles to the 
Pinoleville Pomo Nation have expressed interest in cultivating 
marijuana. In February 2015, the Tulalip Tribe held the first 
Tribal Marijuana conference in Tulalip, Washington, which 
attracted about 400 people, including representatives from 
roughly 75 tribes.21 One month later, a second conference was 
held in San Diego.22 This increased interest shows that many 
tribes are considering the pros and cons of marijuana production 
on tribal lands. 
This Article is not meant to weigh those pros and cons, but 
rather to consider the possible legal outcomes regarding the 
constant tension between states and tribes. It proposes three 
hypothetical scenarios and analyzes the jurisdictional 
quandaries and arguments in each area. This Article focuses on 
the difficulties that may arise where tribes sell marijuana on 
reservations surrounded by states that either allow only medical 
marijuana or have a total marijuana prohibition. 
Here are the three hypothetical scenarios: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Steven Nelson, Native American Tribes Take on Pot, Consider Gamble on 
Legalization, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/27/native-american-tribes-
take-on-pot-consider-gamble-on-legalization.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Jacob Sullum, From Casinos to Cannabis: Indian Tribes Eye Pot Profits, 
FORBES (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2015/03/12/from-casinos-to-
cannabis-indian-tribes-eye-pot-profits/. 
22 Workshop on Tribal Marijuana to be Held Next Month, INDIANZ (Mar. 9, 
2015), http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/016685.asp. 
228 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:222 
	  
 
1) Seneca Nation of Indians: The Seneca Nation, located 
primarily in Western New York, seeks to cultivate and 
sell adult-use marijuana on tribal lands. New York is a 
non-P.L. 280 state but has P.L. 280 jurisdiction provided 
specifically to the state in 25 U.S.C. § 232. New York 
has legalized medical marijuana, which is highly 
regulated. 
 
2) Seminole Tribe of Florida: The Seminoles, located in 
Florida, seek to cultivate and sell adult-use marijuana on 
tribal lands. Florida is a P.L. 280 state, which prohibits 
all forms of marijuana use.  
         
3) The Pinoleville Pomo Nation in California: The 
Pomos in California seek to cultivate and sell medical 
marijuana only. California has legalized only medical 
marijuana but it is not currently regulated at the state 
level.23 California is also a P.L. 280 state. 
 
II. STATE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ISSUES IN P.L. 280 AND NON-
P.L. 280 STATES 
One of the first issues a tribe should consider before 
undertaking the sale and cultivation of marijuana is whether the 
tribe is within a P.L. 280 or non-P.L. 280 state.  
 
A. Issues in P.L. 280 States 
 Generally, criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian 
Country lies with the tribal and federal governments. But there 
are exceptions. In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 83-280, 
18 U.S.C. § 1162, widely known as "Public Law 280," giving 
six states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 On October 5, 2015, the California Governor signed into law the California 
Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act, effective January 1, 2016; 
however, regulations are not expected to take effect until 2017. See, e.g., 
Canorml_admin, Cal Norml: A Summary of the Medical Marijuana Regulation 
and Safety Act (Mmrsa), CA NORML (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.canorml.org/news/A_SUMMARY_OF_THE_MEDICAL_MARIJU
ANA_REGULATION_AND_SAFETY_ACT (providing information on the 
three parts of the Act, Senate Bill No. 643, Assembly Bill No. 266, and 
Assembly Bill No. 243). 
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and Wisconsin) criminal jurisdiction over tribes within their 
boundaries. Between 1953 and 1968, a number of states other 
than the original six also exercised expanded criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country. These jurisdictions are often 
referred to as “optional P.L.-280” jurisdictions. Primarily, these 
include certain reservations in Florida, Idaho, and Washington. 
Congress has also specifically authorized certain other states 
(New York) to exercise jurisdiction over reservations. 
The direct effects of P.L. 280 were twofold: First, it 
extended state criminal jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction over 
reservation Indians in the select states; and second, it eliminated 
special federal criminal jurisdiction over reservation areas in the 
select states.24 Thus, the law substituted state for federal legal 
authority on all designated reservations.25 
Historically, states resented the special rights and status of 
tribes under federal law, and the federal government often 
intervened to protect the tribes.26 P.L. 280 provided these states 
with the right to exercise authority within the reservations.27 
However, P.L. 280 “was not intended to effect total 
assimilation of Indian tribes into mainstream American 
society.”28 Nothing in its legislative history suggests that 
Congress intended P.L. 280’s extension of jurisdiction to the 
states to result in the undermining or destruction of tribal 
governments and turn tribes into “private, voluntary 
organizations.”29 Rather, P.L. 280 provides for the “full force 
and effect” of any tribal ordinances or customs “heretofore or 
hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe . . . if not inconsistent with 
any applicable civil law of the state.”30 Thus, state power is 
limited. 
Nevertheless, in P.L. 280 States, regardless of actions that 
tribes may take to legalize and regulate marijuana, state officials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Carole Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in 
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1416 (1997). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 387 (1976). 
29 Id. at 388 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). 
30 Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2015). 
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may retain the power to enforce state criminal laws prohibiting 
the sale, distribution, or use of marijuana against Indians and 
non-Indians where the state’s marijuana prohibition is deemed 
criminal and prohibitory in nature rather than a civil regulatory 
system pursuant to California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians.31 This Article will now analyze the Cabazon test 
within the context of marijuana and argue that, in certain 
circumstances, state marijuana laws may be regulatory in nature 
rather than prohibitory. 
 
1. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians: Where do 
State Marijuana Laws Fall along the Cabazon Spectrum? 
Even in P.L. 280 states, states may lack jurisdiction to 
enforce their laws in Indian lands if marijuana prohibition is 
considered to be civil-regulatory in nature pursuant to the 
California v. Cabazon test.32 In Cabazon, California attempted 
to regulate Indian bingo operations on the Cabazon and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
32 Although the Michigan v. Bay Mills decision limited California v. 
Cabazon, this article contends that it did not completely overturn Cabazon 
and that the Cabazon test is still intact. Congress established IGRA to solve 
a very specific problem created by Cabazon, not to completely overrule 
Cabazon and its reasoning. For example, in footnote 6 of Bay Mills, the 
Court stated, “[i]ndeed, the statutory abrogation does not even cover all suits 
to enjoin gaming on Indian lands, thus refuting the very premise of 
Michigan's argument-from-anomaly. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), recall, 
allows a State to sue a tribe not for all ‘class III gaming activity located on 
Indian lands’ (as Michigan suggests), but only for such gaming as is 
‘conducted in violation of any Tribal–State compact . . . that is in effect.’ 
Accordingly, if a tribe opens a casino on Indian lands before negotiating a 
compact, the surrounding State cannot sue; only the Federal Government can 
enforce the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2016). To be precise, then, 
IGRA's authorization of suit mirrors not the full problem Cabazon created (a 
vacuum of state authority over gaming in Indian Country) but, more 
particularly, Congress's ‘carefully crafted’ compact-based solution to that 
difficulty. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73–74 (1996). So 
Michigan's binary challenge—if a State can sue to stop gaming in Indian 
Country, why not off?—fails out of the starting gate. In fact, a State cannot 
sue to enjoin all gaming in Indian Country; that gaming must, in addition, 
violate an agreement that the State and tribe have mutually entered.” 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2053 n.6 (2014) Thus, 
the Bay Mills Court stated that IGRA was carefully crafted to deal with a 
specific problem, not to completely eliminate Cabazon. Accordingly, the 
Cabazon test is still good law and can be applied in the marijuana context. 
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Morongo reservations in Riverside County, California.33 
California sought to apply its penal code prohibiting gambling 
except under certain circumstances.34 The code permitted bingo 
when charitable organizations operated the games and prizes did 
not exceed $250 per game.35 The Court held that P.L. 280 did 
not justify California’s enforcement of its gambling laws on 
Indian lands.36 Looking to Bryan v. Itasca Cnty.37 and Duffy v. 
Barona Group of Capitan Band of Mission Indians,38 the Court 
created the civil-criminal dichotomy distinguishing 
“criminal/prohibitory” laws and “civil/regulatory” laws under 
P.L. 280:  
 
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to 
prohibit certain conduct, it falls within P.L. 280's 
grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law 
generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to 
regulation, it must be classified as 
civil/regulatory and P.L. 280 does not authorize 
its enforcement on an Indian reservation…The 
shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue 
violates the state's public policy. 39  
 
The Court determined that California did not prohibit all 
forms of gambling.40 The Court noted that California itself 
operated a state lottery and encouraged its citizens to participate 
in state-run gambling. California also permitted horse-race 
betting and although certain enumerated gambling games were 
prohibited under California law, the games played on the 
Cabazon and Morongo reservations were permissible. The Court 
found it significant that California permitted a substantial 
amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually 
promoted gambling through its state lottery. Thus, the Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 205. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 209–10. 
37 Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
38 Duffy v. Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, 
461 U.S. 929 (1983). 
39 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208–09. 
40 Id. at 210–11. 
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concluded that California regulated rather than prohibited 
“gambling in general and bingo in particular.”41 Accordingly, 
California’s gambling laws were regulatory in nature and thus 
fell outside the scope of P.L. 280; California could not regulate 
the Cabazon gaming.42 
In footnote 10, the Cabazon Court noted that “nothing in this 
opinion suggests that cock-fighting, tattoo parlors, nude 
dancing, and prostitution are permissible on Indian reservations 
within California. The applicable state laws governing an 
activity must be examined in detail before they can be 
characterized as regulatory or prohibitory.”43  
In the marijuana context, tribes may argue that the state 
marijuana law at issue is a regulatory scheme rather than a pure 
prohibitory law. For example, like Cabazon, where California 
permitted some forms of gambling, certain states, such as 
California, permit some forms of marijuana use. Medical 
marijuana is lawful under California law; however, it is largely 
unregulated at the state level.44 Still, the fact that California 
permits a wide range of medical marijuana weighs strongly in 
favor of a civil-regulatory label. 
Similarly, in states such as New York, where medical 
marijuana is heavily regulated, tribes may have a stronger 
argument that marijuana development falls along the civil-
regulatory spectrum. For example, the New York medical 
marijuana code is over 100 pages long, regulating everything 
from possession limits to physician registration to proper 
disposal of marijuana products and everywhere in between.45 
Like the Cabazon bingo gambling, where California allowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 211 n.10. 
44 See Canorml_admin, California NORML Patient's Guide to Medical 
Marijuana, CA NORML (Nov. 2013), http://www.canorml.org/medical-
marijuana/patients-guide-to-california-law. But, California’s regulations of 
medical marijuana under the California Medical Marijuana Regulation and 
Safety Act, when effective, will strengthen the tribal argument that 
California’s marijuana law is a civil-regulatory scheme. 
45 Medical Marijuana Program Regulations, NEW YORK STATE, 
http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/medical_marijuana/regulations.htm (last 
visited May 12, 2016). 
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specific games such as horserace betting and bingo while 
prohibiting other forms of gambling, many medical marijuana 
states allow specific uses of marijuana—namely marijuana to 
treat “debilitating medical conditions”—while prohibiting other 
forms of adult-use marijuana.46 
Although medical marijuana states may not actively 
encourage marijuana use, like California’s encouragement that 
its citizens participate in its state lottery, this does not detract 
from the extensive system that states such as New York have in 
place to regulate marijuana consumption. Even though all 
regulation involves some aspect of prohibition, the test under 
Cabazon and Bryant looks to the most important aspect of the 
statute. Here, the tribal argument will be that the regulation of 
medical marijuana is the critical aspect of the state marijuana 
law. Under Cabazon, the focus must be on the regulatory 
scheme rather than the potential penal sanction. Thus, if a state 
permits but regulates marijuana use then this regulation trumps 
the corresponding criminal punishments. 
For example, during the Cabazon oral arguments, the 
Justices were concerned with the difference between roulette 
wheels, prohibited under California law, and bingo cards, 
permitted by California law, in relation to the narrow difference 
between prohibition and regulation. The answer to this 
distinction was simply that California permitted but regulated 
bingo. Thus, the question becomes: does the inclusion of a penal 
sanction in a regulatory scheme permit state jurisdiction? Under 
Bryant and Cabazon, the answer is no. If this were the law, 
Bryant would be gutted. States are not authorized to exercise 
general jurisdiction. Similarly, where a state prohibits adult-use 
marijuana but permits and regulates medical marijuana, then the 
P.L. 280 state has established a civil-regulatory scheme and 
cannot apply its marijuana criminal sanctions within the 
reservation. 
 Thus, Cabazon and Bryant serve as a counterweight to limit 
state power. In states that regulate some form of marijuana, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 10, § 1004.1–.23 (2015); MD. 
CODE REGS. § 13-3304 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, §§ 1–49 (2016); 
N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.2–.4 (LexisNexis 2014). 
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tribes can likely argue that the state marijuana scheme should 
be considered regulatory, thereby preventing state interference. 
The more regulation the state has in place to govern marijuana, 
the stronger the tribal argument will be. 
 
B. Issues in Non-P.L. 280 States 
State jurisdiction in non-P.L. 280 states is limited to crimes 
committed by non-Indian perpetrators to non-Indian victims. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled in United States v. 
McBratney,47 and Draper v. United States,48 that state courts 
have jurisdiction to punish wholly non-Indian crimes in Indian 
Country. For example, in Draper, the Court stated that “in 
reserving to the United States jurisdiction and control over 
Indian lands, it was not intended to deprive [the] state[s] of 
power to punish for crimes committed on a reservation or Indian 
lands by other than Indians or against Indians.”49 Thus, non-P.L. 
280 states lack criminal jurisdiction to enforce state laws outside 
purely non-Indian offenses. 
Therefore, non-P.L. 280 states lack jurisdiction to enforce 
marijuana prohibitions where tribal members are involved in 
the sale, cultivation, or distribution of marijuana. But, the sale 
of marijuana is not a typical crime because it is usually 
“victimless”; the sale of marijuana does not harm a specific 
person under the traditional view of Indian criminal law 
jurisdiction. This begs the question whether the limitations from 
Draper and McBratney apply to the victimless crimes such as 
the sale of marijuana. If not, then states could argue that they 
would have jurisdiction to enforce penal laws against non-
Indians who sell and buy marijuana on tribal lands. This article 
explores the validity of these potential issues below. 
 
1. United States v. Langford: Can States Exercise Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Victimless Crimes committed by non-Indians? 
The first issue is whether states can exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who sell marijuana as part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
48 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). 
49 Id. at 247. 
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tribal enterprise. A relevant case regarding state jurisdiction of 
victimless crimes committed by non-Indians is United States v. 
Langford. In Langford, a non-Indian was charged with being a 
spectator at a cockfight under 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 1151, and 
1152.50 The cockfight took place at a cockfighting facility 
located on property held in trust by the United States for a 
Kiowa allotment, and was therefore located in Indian Country.51 
The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of whether state criminal 
jurisdiction existed for a victimless crime, perpetrated by a non-
Indian in Indian Country.52 The court found that states possess 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes occurring in Indian 
Country if there is neither an Indian victim, nor an Indian 
perpetrator.53 
In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked to 
McBratney and cited the “equal footing” rationale from that 
case.54 There, the McBratney Court reasoned that Colorado 
entered into the United States “upon an equal footing with the 
original states in all respects whatsoever . . . [and consequently] 
acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens and other 
white persons throughout the territory within its limits.”55 The 
10th Circuit also cited United States v. Ramsey, holding that the 
grant of statehood ended the authority of the U.S. under § 2145 
to punish crimes not committed by or against Indians.56 Also, 
the 10th Circuit noted that under People v. Martin, the Supreme 
Court observed that with respect to “Indian country crimes 
involving only non-Indians, longstanding precedents of this 
Court hold that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction despite 
the terms of § 1152.”57 
Finally, the 10th Circuit noted that the Supreme Court 
suggested in dicta that the McBratney rule applies to victimless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2011). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1197. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1197–98. 
55 Id. at 1198 (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 624 (1881)). 
56 Langford, 641 F.3d at 1198. 
57 Id. at 1198–99 (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990), 
superseded in other respects by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301); see also United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977). 
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crimes.58 In Solem v. Bartlet, the Court stated, “[w]ithin Indian 
country, state jurisdiction is limited to crimes by non-Indians 
against non-Indians, and victimless crimes by non-Indians.”59 
The 10th Circuit found that the “absence of federal jurisdiction 
over victimless crimes perpetrated by a non-Indian in Indian 
country is explicit in the dicta of Solem and implicit in the 
holding of McBratney.”60 
Thus, pursuant to the Solem dicta and the reasoning of the 
10th Circuit in Langford, non-P.L. 280 states could contend that 
they may exercise criminal jurisdiction to enforce marijuana 
prohibitions on Indian reservations where non-Indians are 
involved. The state could severely hamper the tribal business by 
prosecuting any non-Indian employee. This is an issue that 
tribes who cultivate and sell marijuana should consider. To 
avoid this potential issue, tribes could simply limit employment 
in their marijuana industry to only tribal members or non-
member Indians. 
 
2. State Jurisdiction over Non-Indians Purchasing Marijuana on 
the Reservation 
With a colorable argument that states have jurisdiction over 
non-Indian victimless crimes, the next concern then becomes 
whether a state can exercise its criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians purchasing marijuana lawfully on tribal lands. Citing 
cases such as Duro, Solem, Antelope, Martin, Williams, 
McBratney, and Draper, courts from numerous jurisdictions 
have held that state courts have jurisdiction over cases 
involving non-Indian defendants who committed “victimless” 
offenses on Indian lands.61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Langford, 641 F.3d at 1199. 
59 Id. (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 465 n.2 (citing New York ex rel. 
Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946))); see also Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 
1353 (10th Cir.1990) (noting the “Supreme Court has expressly stated that 
state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is limited to crimes committed 
‘by non-Indians against non-Indians . . . and victimless crimes by non-
Indians’”). 
60 Langford, 641 F.3d at 1199. 
61 See, e.g., Langford, 641 F.3d at 1197–99 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
there is clearly no federal jurisdiction for a victimless crime committed in 
Indian Country by a non-Indian because the states possess exclusive 
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For example, in Michigan v. Collins, two non-Indian 
defendants were charged with controlled substance offenses 
that occurred inside an Indian casino located on tribal lands.62 
The Michigan Appellate court found that state courts have 
criminal jurisdiction in cases where a non-Indian defendant 
committed a “victimless” offense in Indian Country.63 Relying 
upon Solem v. Bartlett and several other state cases, the 
Michigan Appellate court determined that it had jurisdiction to 
prosecute the two non-Indian defendants for the sale of 
controlled substances on tribal lands in violation of Michigan 
law.64 
As a counter-argument to Michigan v. Collins, tribes could 
legitimately contend that where the tribe has legalized 
marijuana and the surrounding state still criminalizes marijuana 
use, tribal sovereignty trumps state intrusion. In other words, 
tribes have the right to “make their own laws and be ruled by 
them” as part of their inherent sovereignty.65 Thus, if the tribe 
decriminalizes marijuana consumption on tribal lands, then 
there technically would be no “crime” for the state to punish. 
A tribe could contend that state criminal laws operate on 
tribal lands only so far as a crime concurrently exists under state 
and tribal law. So, if the tribe removes the criminal sanctions 
for marijuana it removes the criminality of marijuana 
consumption on tribal lands and precludes state intrusion. 
Tribes could thus argue that states cannot exercise jurisdiction 
where a “crime” is absent. 
Borrowing from the civil context, “state courts may not 
exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising out of on-reservation 
conduct—even over matters involving non-Indians—if doing so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
criminal jurisdiction over such crimes); New Mexico v. Harrison, 238 P.3d 
869, 874–75 (N.M. 2010); California v. Ramirez, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 639 
n.9 (2007); Connecticut v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, n.31 (Conn. 1997); South 
Dakota v. Vandermay, 478 N.W.2d 289, 290–91 (S.D. 1991); Arizona  v. 
Burrola, 669 P.2d 614, 615–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Michigan v. Collins, 
826 N.W.2d 175, 179–80 (Mich. App. 2012). 
62 Michigan v. Collins, 826 N.W.2d 175 (Mich. App. 2012). 
63 Id. at 176–77. 
64 Id. at 177. 
65 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1997) (quoting Fisher v. 
Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976)). 
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would ‘infring[e] on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them.’”66 This rationale should 
apply to the criminal context as well. Tribes have the power to 
make their own laws pursuant to their status as sovereign 
nations. Part of this sovereignty is the sanctity of tribal codes to 
be free from state interference. Thus, a state should be unable to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over purely on-reservation 
marijuana consumption where the tribe has legalized such 
consumption on tribal lands. 
With this in mind, there is an additional concern that tribal 
marijuana could collide with significant state policy interests 
prohibiting marijuana, triggering the principles of Washington 
v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation. This 
article now addresses this concern and potential solutions. 
 
3. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation: An Additional Concern Regarding State 
Interference 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes, allows states to regulate 
the activities of tribal members on tribal land when state 
interests outside the reservation are implicated.67 In Colville, the 
Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes were selling cigarettes on 
their reservations to nonmembers from off the reservation, 
without collecting the state cigarette tax.68 In response, the state 
of Washington seized shipments of unstamped cigarettes en 
route to the reservations from wholesalers outside the state.69 
The Court held that Washington could require the tribes to 
collect the tax from nonmembers, and could “impose at least 
‘minimal’ burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and 
collecting the tax.”70 The Court also found that Washington’s 
interest in enforcing its taxes was sufficient to justify the 
seizure of cigarettes heading for the reservations.71 The Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Id. 
67 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 142 (1980). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 151. 
71 Id. at 161–62. 
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noted that the mailed cigarettes were not immune from seizure 
where the tribes refused to fulfill obligations to collect the state 
tax.72 Thus, Washington validly seized these cigarettes under its 
ability to police “against wholesale evasion of its own valid 
taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests.”73 
Washington v. Colville is problematic for tribes because the 
sale of cigarettes and the sale of marijuana are eerily similar. 
Like the sale of cigarettes, which targets non-Indian state 
residents, the sale of marijuana will also target and attract state 
residents. Like Colville, where the tribes were marketing an 
exemption from state tax law, tribes will be marketing an 
exemption from state marijuana laws. Also, like cigarettes, 
which involve importing raw goods and materials to be 
packaged and sold, marijuana distribution will also require 
importing the necessary raw materials onto reservations. Thus, 
like Colville, tribes will have to run marijuana resources 
through the surrounding state. This directly intersects with state 
power outside the reservation. 
This is concerning because in Colville, the Court stated, “[i]t is 
significant that these seizures take place outside the reservation, in 
locations where state power over Indian affairs is considerably 
more expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.”74 “Tribal 
activities conducted outside the reservation present different 
considerations” than purely on-reservation activity.75 “State 
authority over Indians is yet more extensive over activities . . . 
not on any reservation.”76 Absent express federal law to the 
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries are 
subject to non-discriminatory state law applicable to all 
citizens.77 Courts broadly apply this principle from state tax to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 162. 
74 Id. at 161–62; see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 
(1973). 
75 Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148. 
76 Id. (citing Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962)). 
77 Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148–49; see also Puyallup Tribe v. 
Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968); Organized Village of Kake, 369 
U.S. at 75–76; Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 683 (1942); Shaw v. 
Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 
U.S. 504 (1896). 
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criminal laws, and would apply this rule to marijuana activities 
outside the reservation.  
 Colville combined with language from Nevada v. Hicks 
could potentially create a formidable state power with respect to 
tribal marijuana. In Hicks, state game wardens executed a search 
warrant of a tribal member’s house on tribal land for evidence of 
an off-reservation crime.78 The Court stated, “[i]t is also well 
established in our precedent that states have criminal 
jurisdiction over reservation Indians for crimes committed off 
the reservation.” “[T]he principle that Indians have the right to 
make their own laws and be governed by them requires ‘an 
accommodation between the interests of the tribes and the 
federal government, on the one hand, and those of the state, on 
the other.’”79  
In Hicks, the Court hinted to the possibility that states may 
have the “right to enter a reservation (including Indian-fee 
lands) for enforcement purposes.”80 The Court reasoned that 
“the state's interest in execution of process is considerable, and 
even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the 
tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law 
impairs state government.”81 
Thus, absent an agreement with the surrounding state, tribes 
will have to minimize the amount of resources imported 
through state boundaries in order to avoid state interference like 
in Colville and the possibility of state intrusion hinted at in 
Hicks. Tribes should also seek to conduct as much of the 
marijuana activity within the reservation as possible. This will 
avoid collisions and complications with state marijuana 
prohibitions outside the reservation. To do so, tribes should seek 
to cultivate, distribute, and consume marijuana only on tribal 
lands. 
The main concern from Colville is the proposition that states 
can regulate tribal member activity on tribal lands where 
significant state interests are implicated. Marijuana 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 356 (2001). 
79 Id. at 362 (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 156). 
80 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363. 
81 Id. at 364. 
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advertisement and distribution to state citizens could trigger 
significant state interests, opening up the door for state 
interference. However, if tribes carefully structure their 
marijuana systems, they may have a legitimate argument to 
avoid Coleville interference and thus prevent state enforcement. 
For example, if tribes use marijuana to generate value on the 
reservation, this may distinguish the sale of marijuana from the 
sale of cigarettes in Colville. In Colville, the Court stressed the 
balance between state and tribal interests: 
 
While the tribes do have an interest in raising 
revenues for essential governmental programs, 
that interest is strongest when the revenues are 
derived from value generated on the reservation 
by activities involving the tribes and when the 
taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The 
state also has a legitimate governmental interest 
in raising revenues, and that interest is likewise 
strongest when the tax is directed at off-
reservation value and when the taxpayer is the 
recipient of state services.82 
  
The key here is that the Colville Court recognized a balance 
between tribal sovereignty and the ability of tribes to raise 
revenue to run their governments on the one hand, and state 
sovereignty and the state’s interest in raising revenue and 
providing services on the other hand. So, the best argument for 
tribes is twofold: 1) tribes have the sovereign right to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them; and 2) tribal marijuana 
businesses generate value for the reservation, which is a 
significant interest that outweighs the state’s interests in 
enforcing its marijuana prohibitions on the reservation. 
Thus, the main argument to distinguish Colville is that tribal 
marijuana ventures create significant on-reservation value. In 
Colville, other than profits, the tribes gained no value from 
selling cigarettes and allowing people to take them off the 
reservation to avoid the state cigarette tax. In other words, the 
tribe was not generating value on the reservation. There, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Colville, 447 U.S. at 156–57 (emphasis added). 
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tribe did not grow the tobacco, manufacture the cigarettes, nor 
produce the secondary products for tobacco consumption. 
Rather, the tribes imported cigarettes from elsewhere and sold 
them without tax to non-Indians who would take them off the 
reservation.83  
In the marijuana context, tribes can avoid this situation by 
growing on the reservation, selling on the reservation, and 
providing places for people to consume marijuana on the 
reservation. Such activity would directly generate a value for 
the tribe. Tribes could also provide recreational services for 
people to enjoy marijuana on the reservation. This would 
supplement the “value generated on the reservation by activities 
involving the tribe” and further distance tribal marijuana from 
the Colville tribal cigarettes. 
Marijuana should be a purely tribal affair. The tribe should 
try to touch every aspect of marijuana cultivation and sale as 
possible. The tribe should try to limit the growth to tribal lands. 
The tribe should seek to manufacture the ancillary marijuana 
products on the reservation as much as possible. The tribe 
should provide places for customers to enjoy the marijuana on 
tribal lands: build a resort, create on-site consumption areas or 
establish environments to enjoy marijuana. The tribe should do 
anything and everything to generate as much “value” through 
marijuana. By doing so, the tribe will have a strong argument to 
distinguish Colville and avoid any excuse for state involvement.  
In the event that states disrupt tribal marijuana activity, this 
paper will now turn to whether tribal sovereign immunity can 
protect the tribe from a state lawsuit. 
 
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 
A. Tribal Immunity 
Another issue linked to tribal marijuana development is 
tribal sovereign immunity and whether this immunity would 
shield both tribes and tribal officers from state suit. Under the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, tribes possess “common-
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law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign 
powers.”84 This immunity is “a necessary corollary to Indian 
sovereignty and self-governance.85 “[T]he qualified nature of 
Indian sovereignty modifies [this] principle only by placing a 
tribe's immunity, like its other governmental powers and 
attributes, in Congress’s hands.”86 Thus, the “doctrine of tribal 
immunity [is] settled law” and bars any suit against a tribe 
absent Congressional authorization or waiver.87 
Tribal immunity applies to suits brought by both states and 
individuals alike.88 Rather than litigate, a state must resort to 
other remedies, even if they would be less “efficient” because 
tribal immunity “is a matter of federal law and is not subject to 
diminution by the states.”89 Tribal sovereign immunity can be 
waived only if a tribe unequivocally waives its tribal immunity 
or Congress unequivocally abrogates tribal sovereign 
immunity.90 
The recent decision of Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community is a good sign for tribal sovereign immunity within 
the context of marijuana regulation. In Bay Mills, the Court 
upheld the Bay Mills Indian community’s immunity from suit 
by Michigan.91 There, Michigan brought suit to enjoin Bay 
Mills’ operation of a casino on land located outside its 
reservation purchased with earnings from a congressionally 
established land trust.92 The Court reasoned that Bay Mills’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) 
(quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)). 
85 Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2030 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort 
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986)). 
86 Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2030. 
87 Id. (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 
U.S. 751, 756 (1998)). 
88 See Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2031. 
89 Id.; see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755 (“There is a difference between the 
right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to 
enforce them.”). 
90 E.F.W. v. St. Stephen's Indian High School, 264 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th 
Cir.1997)). 
91 Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2039. 
92 Id. at 2029. 
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sovereignty implied immunity from the lawsuit.93 The Court 
noted that Congress did not abrogate Bay Mills’ immunity 
because the “abrogation of immunity in IGRA applies to 
gaming on, but not off, Indian lands.”94 The Court also refused 
to “create a freestanding exception to tribal immunity for all off-
reservation commercial conduct.”95 The Court reasoned that to do 
so now “would entail both overthrowing precedent and usurping 
Congress's current policy judgment.”96  Thus, the Court dismissed 
the suit absent Congressional authorization (or waiver).97  
Michigan could not enjoin the casino operations.98 
“The rule flowing from Bay Mills is clear, tribal sovereignty 
is not inferior to that of states.”99 “Despite the fact that tribes 
and states will rarely be able to resolve their differences by 
litigation, no sovereign need suffer the tyranny of another.”100 
There is no evidence that Congress has clearly abrogated tribal 
sovereign immunity regarding tribal marijuana development.101 
Such a Congressional abrogation “must be clear.”102  
To abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, Congress must 
“unequivocally express its purpose to subject a tribe to 
litigation.”103 This rule represents an enduring principle of 
Indian law—although Congress has plenary authority over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. at 2039. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 2030–31. 
98 Id. at 2039. 
99 Weddle, supra note 11, at 69. 
100 Id. 
101 § 862(f) of The Controlled Substances Act does have an Indian provision 
but does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity: “Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to affect the obligation of the United States to any Indian 
or Indian tribe arising out of any treaty, statute, Executive order, or the trust 
responsibility of the United States owing to such Indian or Indian tribe. 
Nothing in this subsection shall exempt any individual Indian from the 
sanctions provided for in this section, provided that no individual Indian 
shall be denied any benefit under Federal Indian programs comparable to 
those described in subsection (d)(1)(B) or (d)(2) of this section.” See 21 
U.S.C. § 862(f) (2015). 
102 Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2031–32. 
103 Id. at 2034; see also C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)). 
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tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact 
intends to undermine Indian self-government.104 Without 
Congressional abrogation or tribal waiver in a state compact,105 
states will have to save their litigation budgets and engage in 
government-to-government discussions when it comes to tribal 
marijuana operations.106 
 
B. Immunity for Tribal Officers 
It seems fairly clear that tribes should be immune from state 
lawsuits, but what about the tribal officials or employees 
working in the marijuana industry? Tribal sovereign immunity 
protects tribal officials acting within the scope of their authority 
as well as tribal employees.107  
However, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme 
Court suggested that the doctrine of Ex parte Young extends to 
the tribal context, allowing suits against tribal officials in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2032; Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 
(1987); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–39 (1986). 
105 For a waiver of sovereign immunity to be effective it must comply with 
tribal law. Colombe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, No. CIV 11–3002–RAL, 2011 
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waive immunity because “[s]uch a finding would be directly contrary to the 
explicit provisions of the Tribal Constitution”); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. 
Kline, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303 (D. Kan. 2004) (“[F]or a waiver of 
sovereign immunity to be effective, the waiver must be in compliance with 
tribal law.” ); World Touch Gaming v. Massena Mgmt. Corp., 117 F. Supp. 
2d 271, 275 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a contractual waiver of sovereign 
immunity was invalid where tribal constitution and civil judicial code 
established that the only way the tribe could waive its sovereign immunity 
was through a tribal council resolution). 
106 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (finding that 
courts should be hesitant to infer a federal cause of action (and therefore a 
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity) where it would disserve the stated 
congressional purpose of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments); Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 
1401, 1411 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
107 Weddle, supra note 11, at 66; see also Hardin v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985). 
246 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:222 
	  
official capacities for declaratory or injunctive relief.108 Some 
scholars suggest that the Ex parte Young doctrine109 “has been 
extended to tribal officials sued in their official capacity such 
that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for 
prospective relief against tribal officers allegedly acting in 
violation of federal law.”110 The rationale is that when tribal 
officials act in violation of federal law, they are acting beyond 
their authority and not on behalf of the tribe and are amenable 
to suit without the protections of tribal sovereign immunity.111 
Thus, tribal employees may be subject to suit when they “act 
beyond the authority that the tribe is capable of bestowing upon 
them under federal laws defining the sovereign powers of Indian 
tribes.”112 
However, the fact that tribal immunity does not bar the suit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Weddle, supra note 11, at 66. 
109 Circuits, including the District of Columbia, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth Circuits 
and Eleventh Circuits, have extended the Ex Parte Young doctrine to tribal 
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 
1140, 1154 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Today we join our sister circuits in expressly 
recognizing Ex Parte Young as an exception not just to state sovereign 
immunity but also to tribal sovereign immunity.”); Vann v. Kempthorne, 
534 F.3d 741, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2008); N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island 
Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir.1993); 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2007) (stating that the Ex Parte Young doctrine “has been extended to tribal 
officials sued in their official capacity such that tribal sovereign immunity 
does not bar a suit for prospective relief against tribal officers allegedly 
acting in violation of federal law.” (citation and internal quotations 
omitted)); Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401, 1410 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (For 
purposes of Ex Parte Young, if individual tribal officials' “actions are in 
violation of the IGRA, then the defendants have acted outside the scope of 
their authority, because tribes are not authorized to conduct Class II and III 
gaming in violation of the IGRA's provisions.”); Tamiami Partners v. 
Miccosukee Tribe, 63 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1995). 
110 Weddle, supra note 11, at 66; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that tribal official 
charged with collecting tax could be sued to enjoin tax collection, although 
tribal chairman with no responsibility for collecting tax could not be sued). 
111 Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1175 (M.D. Ala. 
2014). 
112 See Tamiami Partners by & Through Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63 F.3d 1030, 1045 (11th Cir. 1995); Ex Parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 (1908) (holding that a suit against an individual in 
his official governmental capacity—claiming that the individual is acting 
beyond his authority—is not a suit against the sovereign). 
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does not mean that a cause of action may be implied against the 
official where such action would infringe tribal sovereignty.113 
Other limitations include: 1) where the relief sought is damages, 
Ex parte Young suits may not be maintained against tribal 
officials;114 and 2) suits for damages against employees or 
officers in their individual capacities are barred by immunity 
unless the alleged actions were not within the authority 
delegated by the tribe.115 In other words, “tribal officials are 
protected by sovereign immunity when they act in their official 
capacity and within the scope of their authority.”116 
Tribal employees of tribal marijuana businesses could argue 
that they are acting within the tribal authority to cultivate and 
sell marijuana under the Indian Policy Statement. Although the 
DOJ did not explicitly authorize tribes to produce marijuana, 
the Indian Policy Statement does imply that the federal 
government will not take corrective action so long as tribes 
abide by the eight main enforcement priorities. Also, tribes 
could refer to the states of Colorado, Washington, Alaska, 
Oregon, and the District of Columbia, all of which have 
legalized recreational marijuana, for the proposition that if 
states have the authority to legalize marijuana, then tribes—as 
sovereign entities—also have the authority to legalize and sell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Weddle, supra note 11, at 66. 
114 See Cook v. ACI Casino Enterprises, Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th. Cir. 
2008) (holding that tribal employees were immune from claims they 
performed in their tribal duties because tribal corporations act as an arm of 
the tribe and enjoy the same sovereign immunity granted to the tribe itself); 
Chayoon v. Chno, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (dismissing damages 
claim against tribal officers). 
115 Id. at 66. 
116 Id.; Burrell v. Armijo, 603 F.3d 825, 832–34 (10th Cir. 2010) (dismissing 
individual capacity action where evidence showed defendant was acting 
within his authority as governor of the Pueblo); Native Am. Distrib. v. 
Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1072 (D. Okla. 2007) 
(dismissing individual capacity actions were defendants acting with 
“colorable” claim of authority from the tribe); Frazier v. Turning Stone 
Casino, 254 F. Supp. 2d 295, 307 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (tribal officials have 
qualified immunity unless their challenged actions “were not related to the 
performance of their official duties); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot 
Museum & Research Ctr. Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280–81 (D. Conn. 
2002) (holding that alleging that defendants’ actions were illegal was 
insufficient to surmount qualified immunity; instead actions must be 
“manifestly or palpably beyond his authority”). 
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marijuana. 
With this framework in mind, this Article will now consider 
the potential results of the hypothetical scenarios posed above. 
 
IV. HYPOTHETICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Seneca Nation of Indians 
Within a modified P.L. 280 state, the Seneca Nation will 
have to argue that New York’s regulation of medical marijuana 
has created a regulatory regime such that under Cabazon, New 
York cannot exercise its criminal jurisdiction to penalize 
marijuana sales and consumption on tribal lands. As stated 
above, New York has established a highly regulated system to 
manage medical marijuana, which will support the Seneca 
argument that New York has a regulatory system rather than a 
prohibitory framework in place. If the Senecas can successfully 
argue that New York has a civil-regulatory system in place to 
govern marijuana, then New York’s marijuana penal sanctions 
should have no force and effect within the Cattaraugus 
reservation. 
 
B. Seminole Nation of Florida 
Within a pure P.L. 280 state that prohibits all forms of 
marijuana, the Seminoles face an uphill battle at the moment. 
The Seminoles will be unable to argue that Florida’s marijuana 
framework is regulatory because Florida in no way regulates the 
consumption of marijuana. Rather, Florida purely prohibits all 
forms of marijuana. However, polls show that Florida may be 
moving in the direction of legalizing at least medical marijuana 
and possibly recreational marijuana.117 So, the Seminoles would 
be wise to wait for Florida voters to accept a medical marijuana 
initiative before beginning marijuana operations on tribal lands. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Daniel Kreps, New Poll: Florida Voters Medical Marijuana, 
Decriminalized Weed, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/new-poll-florida-voters-want-
medical-marijuana-decriminalized-weed-20150406.  
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C. Pinoville Pomo Nation 
The Pomo Nation can begin its operations to cultivate and 
distribute medical marijuana within California. Although 
medical marijuana is currently unregulated at the state level, 
California has had medical marijuana for nearly 20 years. The 
recent passage of the California Medical Marijuana Regulation 
and Safety Act further illustrates a civil-regulatory regime.118 
This supports the argument that California regulates rather than 
prohibits marijuana. Also, Pomo marijuana would be very 
similar to Cabazon gaming; both activities are allowed under 
California law. When California’s medical marijuana regulatory 
system goes into effect, this will only support the Pomo’s 
efforts. The Pomos have a strong case for cultivating medical 
marijuana without state interference. 
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the above concerns in mind, tribes should take specific 
measures to avoid triggering state jurisdiction over tribal 
marijuana activity. The first measure is to hire Indian workers 
only. By only hiring tribal members or nonmember Indians, 
tribes can avoid states stepping in to prosecute non-Indian tribal 
marijuana employees. Employing only Indians would remove 
employees’ conduct from the scope of state criminal jurisdiction 
in non-P.L. 280 states where such states can only exercise 
authority over non-Indian conduct. This also provides an added 
benefit by creating jobs for tribal members on the reservation. 
Tribes can also permissibly prefer tribal members/nonmember 
Indians without violating Title VII due to the Indian Preference 
Exemption119 and recent case law out of the Ninth Circuit.120 
Second, tribes should establish on-site smoking facilities to 
ensure that customers consume marijuana on tribal lands. By 
restricting consumption to tribal lands, tribes will avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Canorml_admin, Cal Norml: A Summary of the Medical Marijuana 
Regulation and Safety Act (Mmrsa), CA NORML (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.canorml.org/news/A_SUMMARY_OF_THE_MEDICAL_MARIJU
ANA_REGULATION_AND_SAFETY_ACT.  
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(i) (2015). 
120 See E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 773 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014); see 
also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
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violating priority number three to prevent the diversion of 
marijuana.121 Allowing off-site consumption of marijuana also 
maximizes the potential for diversion to unauthorized users.122  
On-site consumption will also curb state interference because 
when customers take marijuana off of reservation land and into 
the state, they become immediately subject to state jurisdiction 
and punishment. Providing facilities and amenities to consume 
marijuana on tribal lands will also create “generated-value” for 
the tribe thereby avoiding the threat of a Colville intervention. 
Third, tribes should seek to make as much of the industry 
tribally owned, operated, and located on tribal lands as possible. 
Tribes should make the marijuana business a purely tribal 
affair. This will ensure that the tribe’s sovereign immunity 
protects the tribe and its employees from suit. It will also 
provide an extra layer of protection from state interference. By 
making the marijuana industry tribally owned and operated on 
tribal land, this should also insulate the tribe from state civil and 
criminal jurisdiction. 
Fourth, although this Article has discussed ways to insulate 
the tribes from state intervention, tribes, as a practical matter, 
should seek to be transparent with the states about their plans to 
develop tribal marijuana. By doing so, tribes can potentially 
avoid deliberate state efforts to interfere with tribal marijuana 
development due to insecurity, confusion, or displeasure. Tribes 
can also enter into compacts to ensure that customers do not 
divert marijuana into the state, alleviating state and federal 
concerns of diversion and cartel activity. Transparency and 
cooperation to achieve common goals could help tribes 
minimize the desire of states to hamper tribal marijuana efforts. 
Finally, tribes should be cognizant of the potential security 
concerns linked to the sale of marijuana. The inability to bank 
marijuana money due to federal prohibitions leads to businesses 
being inundated with cash. Such large amounts of cash on hand 
make marijuana businesses easy targets for armed robberies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Policy Statement, supra note 7. 
122 W. David Ball, Bring Back the Opium Den: Column, USA TODAY (Feb. 
11, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/02/11/marijuana-legislation-
recreation-legalized-drug-alcohol-column/23254653/.  
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Thus, tribes should take efforts to protect its cash reserves from 
the sale of marijuana. This will help curb criminal conduct on 
the reservations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, tribes should exercise caution when they establish 
their marijuana systems. For tribes affected by P.L. 280, if the 
state flatly bans all marijuana possession and use, that ban will 
apply to the tribal communities. But if states allow any form of 
legal marijuana, tribes have the legal framework for 
legalization. Certain tribes, such as the Seminoles, will likely 
have to wait for state marijuana policies to change before 
making any substantial commitments to tribal marijuana. But, 
for others such as the Senecas or the Pomos, tribal marijuana 
development may be a realistic venture at this time. 
Still, tribes that undertake marijuana businesses should seek 
to make it a purely tribal affair. The tribe should also seek to be 
as insular as possible with the cultivation, sale, and 
consumption of marijuana because activities that go beyond 
reservation boundaries may be subject to any generally 
applicable state law.123 However, if tribes utilize their sovereign 
rights responsibly, the potential for economic growth in the 
field of tribal marijuana is boundless. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 113 (2005) 
(quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)); see 
also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2034–35 (2014). 
